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CoMwmus
The changing nature of the communications process has made it
imperative that the law show concern for the public interest in
effective utilization of media for the expression of diverse points
of view. Confrontation of ideas, a topic of eloquent affection in
contemporary decisions, demands some recognition of a right to
be heard as a constitutional principle.
49
C. Grey Pash, Jr.
CrvnL PiRocEDuRE - FEDERAL RuL,23 2- AGGREGATION OF CLAIMS. -
Plaintiff brought a class action in Missouri federal court alleging
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.' Since plaintiff's indi-
vidual claim was less than $10,000, defendant moved dismissal for
failure to show jurisdiction, contending that aggregation of individual
claims to reach the jurisdictional amount was improper in actions
under Rule 23.2 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court in holding aggregation improper.3 Soon thereafter, the
Tenth Circuit reached the opposite result under similar circumstances
and allowed aggregation of claims to invoke diversity jurisdiction.4
Because of the conflict between the position of the Fifth5 and Eighth
Circuits on one hand and the Tenth Circuit on the other, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 6 Held: Aggregation was improper. Under
Federal Rule 23, separate and distinct claims may not be added to-
gether to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
49 Id. at 1678.
1 The substance of her complaint was that certain directors of the Missouri
Fidelity Union Trust Life Insurance Company had sold their respective shares
at inflated prices, that the money exceeding the fair market value represented pay-
ment to those men to obtain control of the company, and that the excess should
be distributed among the stockholders.
228 U.S.C. § 1832 (1964) requires, inter alia, a showing that . . . the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest
and costs ... " The plaintiff contended that she and 4,000 other stockholders were
entitled to aggregate their individual claims to reach an amount in controversy
of about $1,200,000.
3 Snyder v. Harris, 309 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 393 U.S.
911 (1968). This decision was congruous with a similar ruling by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967).
4 Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. granted,
393 U.S. 911 (1968). This case is the companion to the one which is the sub-
ject of this comment. In a class action, the plaintiff alleged illegal collection of a
city franchise tax from him and 18,000 other customers living outside the city
limits. Although the alleged total overcharge was unknown, the court permitted
Coburn to aggregate his $7.81 claim with those of the other class members, which
aggregate was alleged to total more than $10,000.
5 See note 3 supra.0 Snyder was aTrnmed; Coburn was reversed. See note 4 supra.
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The 1966 version of Federal Rule 23 seems to have posed more
questions than it answered.7 For example, even though the new Rule
abolished the tripartite pigeon holes of "true," "hybrid," and "spurious"
class actions which existed under former Rule 23,8 would the courts
still refer to those classifications when ruling on aggregation under the
new Rule? The question is important because both Snyder and its
companion case would have been spurious class actions under old
Rule 23, actions for which aggregation would not have been allowed.9
In the 1967 case of Alvarez v. Pan American Life Insurance Com-
pany,10 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled aggregation under
new Federal Rule 23 proper only to the extent allowed under the old
Rule. Finding the plaintiff's claims separate and distinct,' the court
held that permitting aggregation under the new Rule would expand
the federal jurisdiction in violation of Rule 82.12 After all, it was
settled doctrine long before the 1938 Federal Rules that "[w]hen
two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands, unite
for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the
demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount... -13
This was the so-called "Pinel doctrine," a black letter interpretation of
the amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332; and the
Alvarez court felt bound under Rule 82 not to molest it by broadly
construing new Rule 23. In the present case, the Supreme Court relies
almost exclusively on this doctrine and expressly refuses to abro-
gate it.
14
7 Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43
F.R.D. 39 (1967).8 "True class actions were those in which the rights of the different class
members were common and undivided; in such cases aggregation [of claims] was
permitted." Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969).
"A 'hybrid' class action involved a class whose members had a mutuality of
interest in specific property ... " Aggregation was not allowed in this type of case.
A prototype of this was the old equity receivership. 43 N.Y.U. L. RLEv. 762, 763
n.5 (1968).
Spurious class actions were in essence a form of permissive joinder in which
parties with separate claims litigated in a single suit because there were common
questions of law or fact; aggregation of claims was not allowed in this type of
action. 394 U.S. at 335.
9 Only in the true class action could the parties plaintiff aggregate their
claims in order to satisfy the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1332. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939).
10 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967).
"1 The plaintiffs were suing in a class action to recover claims allegedly due
them under several insurance contracts.
12 "These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of
the United States District Courts .. " FED. R. Crv. P. 82.
13 Troy Bank v. Whitehead, 222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911). Accord, Clark v. Paul
Gray, 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916); Steele v.
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 164 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1947); Sturgeon v.
Great Lakes Steel Corp., 143 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1944).
14 394 U.S. at 338.
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In the face of the Court's choice against aggregation, several valid
arguments for the opposite result have been presented. Consider the
minority opinion by Mr. Justice Fortas to the effect that a pro-
cedural rule affecting the occasions on which diversity jurisdiction is
exercised does not offend the Pinel doctrine and is therefore not in
violation of Rule 82.15 In addition, it has been asserted that the res
judicata effect upon those in the class who fail to opt out under the
new Rule compels aggregation;' 6 and that since the old "nature of
the claim" test is abolished, aggregation should now be proper for
any action under Rule 23.1' There is also the argument that since the
purpose of the amount in controversy requirement is to clear federal
dockets' and free courts for adjudication of "substantial contro-
versies,"10 federal diversity jurisdiction should be based on the aggre-
gate claim. Equity often measures the amount in controversy either
by what the plaintiff stands to gain or by what the defendant stands
to lose.20 Although no litigant has argued for this test of the juris-
dictional amount, isn't it as logical as any other?
After examining the above technical arguments both for and against
aggregation, the observer remains undecided on the issue because both
arguments have merit.2 ' This case, therefore, can only be explained
15 His reasoning is that even though original Rule 23 permitted litigation of
claims of all class members, notwithstanding that some of them were not of
diverse citizenship from adverse parties, its promulgation was not seen as an en-
largement of jurisdiction. Rather, it changed only the procedural context in which
the subject matter jurisdiction statutes are applied. Id. at 355.
T6 W. BxnoN & A. HOLTzOF, FEDE AL PaaccE AND PTocEDuE § 569,
at 114 (C. Wright ed. Supp. 1968).
17The old Rule examined the nature of the action and determined the
propriety of aggregation according to the standards set out in note 8, supra.
Since the new Rule abolished that inquiry and since at least some actions under
the new Rule would previously have been aggregable, it follows that all claims
properly brought under Rule 23 should now be aggregable.
Another good reason for not letting the old Rule trichotomy rule from its
gave is the Advisory Committee's statement that "[iln practice the terms 'joint,'
common,' etc., which were used as the basis of the Rule 23 classification, proved
obscure and uncertain." Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39
F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966).
18Tlusty v. Gillespie-Rogers-Pyatt Co., 35 F. Supp. 910 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
193 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 3099 (1958).
20 "In determining the matter in controversy, we may look to the object sought
to be accomplished by plaintiff's complaint; the test for determining the amount
in controversy is the pecuniary result to either party which the judgment would
directly produce." Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 116 F.2d 604, 606 (10th
Cir. 1940). This was a suit in equity to quiet title, wherein the value of recovery
to the plaintiff was less than the cost of compliance to the defendant, the latter
figure being the only one meeting the then $3,000 amount in controversy min-
imum. See Ridder Bros. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1944); Enzor
v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 14 F. Supp. 677 (E.D.S.C. 1936).2 'Ths the logical analysis makes no judgments for us, it simply focuses
our direction toward possible concrete referents on which to judge.' Kennedy,
Valuing Federal Matter in Controversy, An Hohfeldian Analysis in Symbolic Logic,
35 TEmN. L. Ra. 423. 434 (1968).
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by looking beyond the written opinion into the values that underlie
the decision.
Seen in the federal context, this decision reveals itself to be both
approach and avoidance; approach to federalism and avoidance of
the administrative problems surrounding Rule 23. In barring a Rule
23 diversity case from the federal forum, the Court has thrown state
tribunals a formidable body of law to fashion.22 In light of the now-
popular consumer fraud class suits, this takes on added significance.
Avoidance, however, seems to be the prime motive. Recognizing that
aggregation under Rule 23 would require aggregation under Rules 18
(joinder of claims) and 20 (permissive joinder), 23 the Court refuses
to thus increase the federal case load. The decision also throws to the
state courts the responsibility of ruling on aggregation according to
the old rule standards. 24 Perhaps the best example of avoidance is the
Court's refusal to overrule the judge-made Pinel doctrine by in-
terpreting congressional silence on the matter as tacit approval of
that long standing test.
25
Potential class action litigants unable to invoke federal question
jurisdiction are now faced with three options. They may, of course,
bring class actions in state court subject to state jurisdictional limi-
tations, and grapple with the non-uniform case law which will con-
tinue to surround the state versions of Federal Rule 23.26 Secondly, it
may still be possible for class action litigants in diversity cases to enter
the federal forum by resorting to Rule 23.2 which allows class ac-
tions by unincorporated associations. Since under former Rule 23
such an action was a true class suit27 in which aggregation of claims
22 "Suits involving issues of state law . .. can often be most appropriately
tried in state court." 394 U.S. at 341.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter would surely have been well satisfied with this case,
as indicated by the following passage from one of his concurring opinions:
Madison believed that Congress would return to the state courts judicial
power entrusted to the federal courts 'when they find the tribunals of
the states established on a good footing'.. . . Can it fairly be said that
state tribunals are not now established on a sufficiently 'good footing' to
adjudicate state litigation that arises between citizens of different
States. . . .? Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 49
(1954) (concurring opinion).
23 394 U.S. at 340.
24The Court justified this relegation as follows:
But the disadvantageous results are over-emphasized, we think, since
lower courts have developed largely workable standards for determining
when claims are joint and common, and therefore entitled to be aggre-
gated, and when they are separate and distinct and therefore not
aggregable. Id. at 341.
251d. at 339.26 This assumes that the plaintiff's state adopts a rule substantially identical
to Federal Rule 23.27 Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 148 F.2d
403 (4th Cir. 1945). See generally 3B J. MooRE, FEDmiAL PnACicE f1 23.02
(2d ed. 1969).
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was permitted, the instant holding would not affect such an action.
Even if the prospective members can be identified without the aid
of discovery devices,28 the political effort and expense of organizing
such an association may effectively preclude use of this device. Finally,
if state legislation permits, the above-mentioned organization could
sue in its own capacity in federal court without any resort to the
class action requirements. Although it can sue as an entity, no citizen-
ship has been accorded the unincorporated association; 29 citizenship
of each member, therefore, would have to be diverse from that of the
adverse parties-and total diversity in an interstate organization is
rare. Although none of the three options is a cure-all for small claim
litigants, each has its peculiar disadvantage. An application of these
options to the facts of each new case should aid counsel in selecting
the route presenting the fewest difficulties.
Steve Hixson
Cv PNocmuPx-Ci.Ass AcnoN-APPmcAtrrY FOR CoNstMM/Com-
MoN LAw FRAuD.-On July 1, 1969, the Kentucky Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure [hereinafter referred to as Civil Rules] were amended to con-
form to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which had been changed
in 1966. Civil Rule 23, Class Actions, was one of the rules changed.1
On July 3, 1969, a class action was ified in Madison Circuit Court
28 Since the members of the class are often identified by using the discovery
rules after commencement of the action, resort to advertising would probably be
necessary to identify those entitled to join the association-a costly and time
consuming proposition.2 9 8B J. MoonE, FEDEmAL PRncncE ff 23.08, at 2510 (2d ed. 1969).
1 The applicable section to be discussed here is Ky. R. Cv. P. 23.02(3), the
section that followed the old "spurious" class action concept. Ky. R. Civ. P.
23.02(3) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of Rule
23.01 are satisfied, and in addition ... (3) the court finds that the ques-
tions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (a) the interest of members of the class in individually con-
trolling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (b) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already com-
menced by or against members of the class; (c) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the par-
ticular forum; (d) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the man-
agement of a class action.
A complete analysis of Ky. R. Crv. P. 23 is beyond the scope of this comment
and the 23.02(3) provision will be considered as the controlling part of the
rule for this discussion. It should be noted however that other provisions of Ky.
R. Cxv. P. 23 must be satisfied before the 23.02(3) provision becomes an issue.
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